Transport Retail and General Workers Union v Registrar of Labour Relations [2026] ZALCD 51

Date of Judgment & Seat of Court: 9 July 2026, Labour Court, Durban

Case No: D377/2022

Name of Judge(s): Prior AJ

Summary of Factual Matrix:

The Transport Retail and General Workers Union (THORN), registered since 1997 under number LR2/6/2/442 and renamed in 2018, had its registration cancelled by the Registrar of Labour Relations, whose notice was published on 21 July 2022. The Registrar acted on the complaints of a Ms Kovu, a former general secretary removed from office in 2015, who claimed to represent a competing faction under the former name THOR. The Registrar's stated grounds were that the union had ceased to function as a genuine trade union and in terms of its constitution, and had failed to comply with ss 98 to 100 of the Labour Relations Act. The union had filed audited financial statements, and the cancellation was suspended pending appeal on 11 August 2022.

The union appealed under s 111(3). The Registrar raised non-joinder of THOR in her heads of argument and contended that she had no option but to deregister the union to protect the public.

Summary of Findings:

[27] ‘It is trite law that the court and the parties are bound by the pleadings and where apposite, a pre-trial agreement and the issues they may have agreed to in the pre-trial minute. A Court cannot and should not go beyond the issues it is required to determine, with reference only to the pleadings and the pre-trial minute.’

[32] ‘I am of the view that Respondent’s raising the issue of non-joinder at the argument stage as an in-limine issue is not competent and falls to be dismissed.’

[33] ‘Even if I am wrong in dismissing this point in limine on this ground, the facts of this case clearly show that there is only one registered trade union, namely the Appellant, who operates under the registration number given as far back as 1997, namely LR2/6/2/442.’

[34] ‘Despite their say so, the Respondent cannot be correct in asserting that THOR, as a registered trade union, exists. This flies in the face of the Respondent’s own documents that they issued confirming the name change to THORN and the issuing of a certificate of registration on 30 May 2018 in that name.’

[36] ‘Whilst registration of a trade union is not compulsory in our labour law it is axiomatic that registration confers rights on trade unions they would not have in respect of organisational rights and collective bargaining. However, even if a trade union exists only at the level of a voluntary association our common law still requires that in order to exist a union must have a valid constitution and reflect that it is an association of employees whose principal purpose is to regulate relations between employees and employers.’

[38] ‘I am of the view that Kovu cannot have an interest in her own right as an individual in that her status was never verified and given the nature of the Respondent’s jurisdiction which is to deal with trade unions as voluntary associations requiring registration her role is of no significance.’

[39] ‘In the circumstances there is no other entity that has a valid legal interest in the outcome of this appeal.’

[40] ‘An appeal under section 111 (3) of the Act is an appeal in the widest sense.’

[43] ‘The deregistration of a trade union has serious consequences. It could be argued that despite having a legitimate purpose if properly imposed, deregistration is draconian.’

[44] ‘An examination of the Respondent’s reasons marked: ‘2nd Submission dated 22 July 2022’ [19] shows that at the most basic of levels they were not an exemplar of clear thought or communication. The submission is replete with contradictions and non sequiturs.’

[45] ‘During argument Mrs De Klerk conceded that the appeal before me is an appeal in the widest sense allowing the Appellant to rely on evidence that the Respondent may not have had at the time of cancelling the Appellant’s registration. The Respondent’s Heads did not deal with this aspect, and Mrs De Klerk stated that she had nothing further to add. This concession was well made.’

[47] ‘For all intents and purposes the Annual Financial Statements appear to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Practices. In any event no evidence was placed before me to gainsay this evidence. This being the case, it can hardly be argued , as the Respondent does, that these were artificial.’

[48] ‘In the circumstances I find that the Respondent had no basis to deregister the Appellant on the grounds of non-compliance with sections 98, 99 and 100 of the Act.’

[49] ‘In determining whether the Appellant had ceased to function as a trade union and had ceased to function in terms of its constitution, the Respondent was obliged to comply with the Guidelines issued in terms of Section 95(8) of the Act, ( “the Guidelines”) [22]’

[50] ‘In terms of paragraph 3 of the Guidelines the Respondent, in order to determine whether the Appellant was genuine, and given that it was an existing organisation, was obliged to pay attention to its actual activities and functioning and consider all relevant factors. [23]’

[51] ‘There is no evidence that the Respondent conducted an assessment of the Appellant and objectively evaluated as to whether the Appellant was a genuine trade union. From the Respondent’s own records up to March 2021 the Appellant was shown to be a compliant trade union and no evidence existed to challenge the fact that the Appellant was a genuine trade union.’

[52] ‘Given that in the Respondent’s reasons, the Respondent admits that the documentary evidence submitted by Kovu in the name of THOR was not credible or reliable, this should have informed the Respondent that this information could not trigger any suggestion that the Appellant was not functioning as a genuine trade union. The fact that THOR was clearly not a registered trade union ought to have convinced the Respondent that there could be no likelihood of genuine competing interests.’

[54] ‘There was absolutely no evidence before the Respondent that the Appellant was not compliant with the requirements of being independent of employers, that it was not an association not for gain and that ( despite the bald assertion to the contrary) individuals were profiting from the operations of the Appellant as a trade union.’

[55] ‘The proper approach for a disaffected member of a trade union is to operate within the confines of that trade union’s constitution to affect any change in leadership.’

[56] ‘In effect what the evidence shows is that Kovu despite having unclean hands, managed to convince the Respondent to deregister the Appellant based on, by the Respondent’s own admissions, evidence that was clearly not credible and was unreliable. This cannot be allowed to stand.’

[57] ‘I am therefore of the view that the Respondent made a decision without objectively considering the evidence and failing to follow a proper examination of the Appellant’s activities, which is not justifiable on any construction of the facts and is clearly wrong in law.’

[62] ‘The Respondent being the Registrar of Labour Relations is not a lay litigant. The office of the State Attorney, who advised the Respondent, are no fledglings in litigation matters either. The Respondent made a conscious and calculated decision to oppose the Appeal.’

[63] ‘The Appellant was forced to approach this Court on appeal to vindicate its rights. The fact that the Respondent had no genuine justification for deregistering the Appellant as a trade union, is a factor that tips the scales in favour of allowing the Appellant its legal costs.’

Relief: The appeal was upheld and the Registrar's decision to cancel the union's registration was set aside. The registration was reinstated with immediate effect, and the Registrar was directed to publish notices of reinstatement in the Government Gazette within 20 days. The Registrar was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

Judgment on SAFLII