Teise v John Taolo Gaetsewe District Municipality & others [2026] ZALCJHB 398

Date of Judgment & Seat of Court: 19 October 2026, Labour Court, Johannesburg

Case No: 2026/251444

Name of Judge(s): Tlhotlhalemaje J

Summary of Factual Matrix:

The applicant, the Municipal Manager of the John Taolo Gaetsewe District Municipality on a fixed-term contract, was arrested by the Hawks in June 2026, placed on compulsory leave and then on precautionary suspension by resolution of the Council. His urgent application to the Northern Cape High Court challenging the Special Council meeting, the suspension and the Municipality's compliance with the Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers was dismissed with costs by Mamosebo J on 25 July 2026. The Council thereafter adopted an investigation report and disciplinary proceedings were convened, with the hearing set down for 19 to 21 October 2026.

On 9 October 2026 the applicant brought an urgent application in the Labour Court to interdict the disciplinary hearing pending a review said to have been instituted in the High Court. He also challenged the authority of the Municipality's attorneys and of the acting Municipal Manager who deposed to the answering affidavit. The Municipality contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction, that the matter was res judicata, and that any urgency was self-created. The application was determined on the papers.

Summary of Findings:

[16] ‘Even if the Court ultimately condones the error, this does not soften the blow to this application’s fate. That error is but one of many glaringly apparent from the founding affidavit, including references to ‘Part B’ of a review that did not exist, and incorrect dates referenced elsewhere in the background to this judgment. The invariable conclusion, also in reference to the various averments throughout the founding affidavit pertaining to the grounds on which declaratory relief is sought, is that the affidavit demonstrates a ‘cut and paste’ hashed job from the papers before Mamosebo J. Such shoddy legal drafting, let alone on the urgent roll, is inexcusable, and the Court would have to show its displeasure in this regard.’

[22] ‘It must be said that on this Court’s urgent roll, real and valid preliminary points are ordinarily raised. However, some points are invariably characterised by nitpicking, and what was referred to as technical point-taking and obstructive conduct in Tshabalala v Mutenga and Another (Tshabalala) [2]. These are raised for no objective legal purpose other than to test the Court’s patience, or, at most, to intentionally display frivolity and vexatiousness. The applicant's point on authority falls into the latter category, and the consequences of pursuing it are well known.’

[23] ‘In Tshabalala, this Court succinctly captured the frustration of courts and the dismay of having to determine pointless preliminary points that various authorities, including Ganes, have already settled. First, I fail to appreciate the logic of pursuing the same objection regarding the Municipality’s attorneys of record’s authority, which, as stated above, was raised and abandoned before Mamosebo J in the Kimberly High Court. It is not clear what has changed since then. The applicant's conduct makes it apparent that the intention is to irritate both the Court and the Municipality.’

[25] ‘In this case, it is unclear what the basis of the objection is to Booysen having deposed to the answering affidavit. To throw back to the applicant what was submitted at paragraph 8 of the supplementary heads of argument, the Court is indeed satisfied that the existing arrangements in respect of the appointment of Booysen as the acting Municipal Manager, in the absence of that appointment being challenged, clearly establish the necessary authority, which ought to dispose of this meritless objection.’

[27] ‘The founding affidavit, which spans 236 pages, together with annexures, says nothing about the basis of jurisdiction, let alone any reference to the concept. The Municipality’s observation that the pleadings, including the Notice of Motion, do not plead jurisdiction is on point.’

[28] ‘The issue, however, is that a mere restatement of statutory provisions does not confer jurisdiction on the court. It is the basis upon which, on the pleaded case, the Court must assume jurisdiction.’

[29] ‘It is equally incorrect, let alone ludicrous, for the applicant, in paragraph 25.3 of the replying affidavit, to suggest that, simply because the matter revolves around section 34 of the Constitution, this must therefore trigger this Court's jurisdiction. Section 34 merely guarantees a right of access to courts to have disputes resolved by the application of law. It does not on its own confer jurisdiction on courts to grant anything that a litigant seeks when there is no legal basis to do so.’

[30] ‘Equally without merit is the contention that in the founding affidavit the applicant had pleaded dignity and professional interests as considerations for jurisdiction. These considerations do not trigger jurisdiction; they are merely consequences that flow from any adverse disciplinary step taken against any employee, and reliance on section 34 cannot be of assistance.’

[32] ‘It is worth repeating that the founding affidavit did not refer to any provision of the LRA or other legislation that specifically conferred jurisdiction on the Court. The applicant contends that the Municipal Council failed to comply with the fixed-term contract of employment and the Regulations. Clearly, this amounts to a claim of breach of the employment contract. He contends that this Court is enjoined to intervene and declare the impugned decision unlawful and invalid for failing to comply with the Regulations and the contract.’

[33] ‘If he expressly pleaded the basis of jurisdiction on his fixed-term employment contract, he nowhere pleaded or relied on section 77(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. These provisions were raised for the first time in the supplementary heads of argument. In any event, if this were the case that he placed reliance on his fixed-term contract and to the extent that he had disavowed any reliance on the unfairness regime and instead alleged unlawfulness resulting from the breach, the only relief to which he can claim is that of specific performance or damages[9], something that is found nowhere in the pleadings. In effect, on the face of the Notice of Motion, he appears to seek any relief in a vacuum, in view of reliance on a review that does not exist, and of which the Court was not informed when that review can be prosecuted any further beyond waiting for the Registrar in the High Court to allocate a case number. In these circumstances, the Court lacks jurisdiction.’

[35] ‘The essentials of the exceptio res judicata are threefold: the previous judgment was given in an action or application by a competent court between the same parties, based on the same cause of action, and with respect to the same subject-matter[10]. It is a fundamental common law and constitutional principle that prevents the re-litigation of matters in respect of the same cause of action between two parties that were finally determined.’

[38] ‘The court has made its conclusion on the alleged review application. The distinction sought to be made in respect of this matter, and the one before Mamosebo, is not only artificial but disingenuous. Irrespective of how the relief was framed, and notwithstanding the lack of basis for any interim relief that may be sought, this application is equally concerned with interdicting the Municipality from conducting any disciplinary hearing against the applicant, including the disciplinary set down on 19, 20 and 21 October 2026. He equally challenges his suspension and alleged breach of the Regulations and his fixed-term contract. He implored the Court to declare his suspension and the disciplinary hearing unfair and invalid for several reasons, which I do not intend to repeat in this judgment. However, the relief sought in this application, and in the application before Mamosebo J, is based on the same cause of action and concerns the same subject matter, irrespective of how the applicant framed them in the two matters. The two applications arose from the impugned Report, the convening of the Special Council meeting, the adoption of the Report, and the decision to suspend and remove the applicant as Municipal Manager. Mamosebo J, having analysed the evidence, had concluded that there was cause to suspend the applicant and found no merit in the alleged breaches of the Regulations.’

[39] ‘Clearly, this application attempts to re-litigate the same issues, with the clear objective of halting the disciplinary process. It is clearly impermissible, on the doctrine of res judicata, for this Court to be unduly burdened with determining issues properly and finally determined by Mamosebo J.’

[41] ‘The question of whether a matter is sufficiently urgent to be enrolled is underpinned by the issue of the absence of substantial redress in an application in due course. Where the requisite degree of urgency is absent, and where an applicant fails to establish that substantial redress is not available in due course, the matter must be struck from the roll[13].’

[44] ‘The Court has already concluded that the review application forming part B of the application does not exist. To reiterate, the alleged review application was not attached to the founding affidavit. Annexure ‘A’ to the founding affidavit is merely a copy of a Court Online confirmation that the initiating document to commence a matter was received on 08 October 2026 at the Kimberly Division of the High Court. Effectively, as at 9 October 2026, when the application before this Court was launched, uploaded on Caselines and enrolled for a hearing, the review application did not exist. Everything else raised in the supplementary heads of argument related to the status of that review application since 9 October 2026, inclusive of what is referred to as ‘ objectively documented’, is neither here nor there in the light of the conclusions to be reached in this judgment. But as the pleadings stood at the hearing date, the Court will conclude that no such review application exists and that annexure ‘A’ to the founding affidavit is irrelevant.’

[46] ‘The truncated time periods, as correctly pointed out on behalf of the Municipality, are extraordinary given the time since he became aware of the scheduling of the disciplinary enquiry. It is not correct that the applicant's approach to the Court a few days before the disciplinary enquiry therefore triggered urgency.’

[47] ‘The applicant knew of the pending disciplinary hearing no earlier than 23 September 2026, when he was served notice. At most, his legal representatives knew of the scheduled dates as far back as 1 October 2026, when the enquiry was postponed in his absence after a copy of a medical certificate was produced. Nowhere in the founding papers does the applicant explain the reasons for the delay from 1 October 2026, or why the matter suddenly became so urgent that any harm would be imminent if the matter were not accorded urgency. Whether the applicant was aware from 1 September or 1 October 2026 does not change the fact that he failed to act with the necessary haste. Attempts in the supplementary heads of argument to explain the delay in the guise of legal submissions are indeed unfortunate. Any such explanation is not set out anywhere in the founding papers.’

[49] ‘Several factors clearly demonstrate that the applicant will take whatever measures to ensure he is not subjected to a disciplinary process to its conclusion and answer to the allegations of misconduct against him. These include his various challenges to his suspension and removal as Municipal Manager through correspondence from his attorneys, his application before Mamosebo J, his repeated requests to postpone the disciplinary hearing, his extraordinary haste in approaching the Kimberly High Court yet again with a purported ‘review application’, and his simultaneous launch of this application.’

[50] ‘Other than manufacturing his own urgency, the applicant, for reasons best known to him and unrelated to any legal basis, and further on contrived grounds, seeks to circumvent the very avenue through which he can obtain substantial redress in due course, and even then, only after the full evidence at a disciplinary enquiry has been ventilated. To the extent that the disciplinary enquiry may result in an adverse outcome, other remedies remain available to him either under the dispute resolution provisions of the LRA or of any other statutory provision he may wish to rely on, other than this extraordinary urgent procedure. Accordingly, the applicant has not satisfied the requirements of urgency.’

[51] ‘It is safe to conclude that, to the extent that the applicant appears to have disavowed any reliance on the unfairness jurisdiction in the LRA, ordinary rules of costs ought to follow the result. Even if the Court applied the requirements of law and fairness under section 162 of the LRA when considering costs, they would not have favoured the applicant.’

[53] ‘The facts and background of this case, together with the manner, conduct and basis on which the applicant approached this Court and the Kimberly High Court, clearly represent classic abuse of Court processes.’

[54] ‘However, where the Court is confronted with frivolous and vexatious applications such as the one in casu, it can only continue to demonstrate its displeasure at its abuse through punitive costs, with the hope that the message will filter through.’

[55] ‘The Court has already expressed its dismay at the shoddy draftsman ship in the applicant’s prolix pleadings, the obvious defects and rehashed averments that clearly appear to be a poor cut-and-paste job from the pleadings before Mamosebo J, attempts to rely on the same issues laboriously ventilated before and determined by Mamosebo J, attempts to raise preliminary points settled by legal authorities, and the outright failure to satisfy the requirements of urgency.’

[56] ‘Regrettably and inevitably, it is not the Municipality that will have to bear the costs of defending this and other frivolous and vexatious cases that ought not have burdened the Courts. It is the taxpayer that is ultimately burdened with such costs. This trend cannot continue, nor be encouraged. In all of this, the Court, when considering a cost order, is mindful of the distinct difference between a robust pursuit of access to justice or advancement of employees’ interests, and a conscious strategy by employees to adopt all contrived means to escape having to answer to serious allegations of misconduct levelled against them. Where cases fall in the latter category, punitive costs ought to be justifiable.’

Relief: The applicant's preliminary point on authority was dismissed and, the respondents' points of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction having been upheld, the application was struck from the roll for lack of urgency. The applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs on the attorney and client scale (the order also contains a paragraph directing each party to pay its own costs).

Judgment on SAFLII