Monama v Royal Bafokeng Platinum (Ex Tempore) [2026] ZALCJHB 376

Seat of Court: Labour Court, Johannesburg

Date Delivered: 6 October 2026

Case No: JR1666/21

Name of Judge(s): Van Nieuwenhuizen AJ

Factual Summary:

The applicant, a senior employee and mine manager, was dismissed by Royal Bafokeng Platinum following disciplinary proceedings conducted by way of written representations, on charges including failing to identify and act upon a conflict of interest between two contractors (charge 3) and failing to take timeous steps regarding inflated contractor rates (charge 6). The commissioner found the dismissal substantively and procedurally fair, and on 21 April 2026 the Court dismissed the applicant’s review application.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Labour Appeal Court, contending that others in the approval chain had not been disciplined; that the commissioner had relied on a hearsay spreadsheet on charge 5 without an admissibility enquiry under section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, said to raise a compelling reason for an appeal; that the reasons on charge 7 were inadequate; and that the switch from an oral hearing to written representations and the involvement of a particular manager rendered the dismissal procedurally unfair. This ex tempore judgment, delivered on 18 June 2026, was edited on 6 October 2026.

Legal Questions Considered:

[3] ‘Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 requires more than a mere possibility that another court might arrive at a different conclusion. The applicant must show a sound, rational basis for the conclusion that the appeal would have reasonable prospects of success. This is particularly so in labour matters where the Labour Appeal Court has repeatedly cautioned that leave to appeal ought not to be granted lightly.’

[4] ‘The present matter arises from a review application. That is significant. The question is not whether another court may prefer a different factual conclusion on the record, the question is whether there exists a reasonable prospect that the Labour Appeal Court would find that I erred in concluding that the Commissioner’s Award fell within the band of reasonableness contemplated in Sidumo and the authorities that followed it.’

[7] ‘I am not persuaded that this ground enjoys reasonable prospects of success.’

[8] ‘The complaint, once again, seeks to isolate particular facts from the totality of the evidence before the Commissioner. The conflict of interest was not merely that POOGI and Bambatha had overlapping interests or that Doctor Phyllis had a connection to both entities. The evidence accepted by the Commissioner was that POOGI was already operating on the mine, that the applicant sat on the Bid Adjudication Committee and that the relationship between POOGI and Bambatha created a situation in which the measurement of work and the financial consequences of that measurement were materially implicated.’

[9] ‘The evidence was sufficient to sustain the Commissioner’s conclusion that the applicant as a senior employee and Mine Manager owed a personal duty to the third respondent to identify and act on that conflict. The duty was not displaced merely because other employees or committees were also involved in the Board approval process.’

[10] ‘The fact that the Exco, the Board or Harris approved the contract does not without more render the Commissioner’s conclusion unreasonable, nor does the fact that others were not charged, established that the applicant could not reasonably be found guilty. The applicant’s seniority, his operational role, his position on the Bid Adjudication Committee and his knowledge of the relevant intersections were all matters before the Commissioner. I remain of the view that the Commissioner’s finding on charge 3 was one that a reasonable decision-maker could reach. There is no reasonable prospect that the Labour Appeal Court would interfere with that conclusion on review.’

[12] ‘Charge 6 did not turn only on who originally negotiated the Bambatha rates. It concerned the applicant’s failure as Mine Manager to take reasonable and timeous steps once the issue of inflated rates had arisen and once the financial prejudice to the third respondent was apparent. The evidence included the reduction of rates after the issue was raised, and the Commissioner was entitled to consider that reduction as part of the objective evidential matrix.’

[13] ‘The applicant’s submissions on charge 6 invite an appellate reconsideration of the merits. That is not the applicable test. The question is not whether another decision-maker could have placed greater weight on the role of Supply Chain, the question is whether the Commissioner’s conclusion was one that a reasonable decision-maker could reach.’

[14] ‘The evidence before the Commissioner, and having regard to the applicant’s senior role, the conclusion on charge 6 was reasonably open to the Commission. There is no reasonable prospect that the Labour Appeal Court would find otherwise.’

[16] ‘I accept that hearsay evidence in CCMA proceedings must be dealt with carefully. Section 138 of the Labour Relations Act permits for arbitration proceedings to be conducted with the minimum of legal formalities, but it does not permit a Commissioner to ignore the requirements governing hearsay evidence where those requirements are properly implicated. Exxaro and Goldplat confirm that hearsay evidence cannot simply be received and relied upon without proper regard to its admissibility, reliability and fairness. That does not assist the applicant on the facts of this case.’

[17] ‘First, the applicant was legally represented at the arbitration, the spreadsheet was not sprung upon him after the event. It was dealt with during the arbitration. The applicant’s representative did not object to its introduction on the basis that it was hearsay. The applicant engaged with the document, cross-examined in relation to it and dealt with it in his own evidence. On these facts the applicant faces the difficulty that the record demonstrates at least a tacit acceptance that the document would form part of the evidential material before the Commissioner.’

[18] ‘Second, I do not read Exxaro or Goldplat as laying down a rigid rule that whenever a document containing hearsay features appears in a CCMA arbitration a Commissioner commits a reviewable irregularity if he or she does not mero motu conduct a formal admissibility inquiry, despite represented parties having raised no objection and having conducted the arbitration on the basis that the material is before the Arbitrator. The inquiry remains contextual.’

[19] ‘Third, even assuming in the applicant’s favour that the spreadsheet ought to have been treated differently, the point is not outcome dispositive. The Commissioner’s findings on charges 3 and 6 independently sustain the conclusion that the applicant committed serious misconduct warranting dismissal. The Labour Appeal Court is unlikely to entertain an appeal on a point which, even if decided in the applicant’s favour, would not alter the result.’

[20] ‘Fourth, the alleged compelling reason, therefore, does not arise in a manner that justifies leave. Courts do not grant leave to appeal for the purpose of deciding abstract or academic legal questions. The hearsay point is not a proper vehicle for the Labour Court to resolve any broader legal issue because of the facts of this case the dismissal remains sustainable on charges 3 and 6.’

[21] ‘I am accordingly not persuaded that there are reasonable prospects of success on charge 5, nor that there exists a compelling reason for the appeal to be heard on the hearsay issue. […] This ground does not advance the application for leave to appeal. In the review judgment I recorded that the Commissioner did regard charge 7 by itself as a dismissible offence. Even if there were merit in the applicant’s criticism of the Commissioner's reasoning of this charge, it would not affect the outcome. There is accordingly no reasonable prospect that the Labour Appeal Court would grant the leave on the basis of charge 7.’

[23] ‘I am not persuaded that either point enjoys reasonable prospects of success. The third respondent’s Behavioural Management Procedure expressly permitted a departure from the procedure where circumstances required it, provided that the hearing remained fair.’

[24] ‘The Labour Relations Act does not require disciplinary proceedings to assume the form of a criminal trial or a fully adversarial process. The essential question is whether the employee was afforded a fair opportunity to be heard. The applicant was provided with the allegations against him and was afforded an opportunity to make written representations, he did so.’

[25] ‘He was thereafter afforded a further opportunity to address a sanction, he did so. The fact that the third respondent initially contemplated an oral hearing does not, without more, render the ultimate process unfair. The applicant also failed to show what prejudice was caused by the procedure that was adopted, in particular the applicant did not demonstrate what evidence he was unable to place before the third respondent, what issue he was unable to address or what cross-examination would probably have changed the outcome, or has changed the outcome.’

[26] ‘As to Carr the applicant’s case remains too thin. A reasonable apprehension of bias must be grounded in facts, it is not enough to say that Carr was involved in Prinsloo’s disciplinary process or that he was aware of the investigation. The applicant did not establish what Carr's evidence in Prinsloo’s hearing was, what role Carr played in Prinsloo’s dismissal or how those facts objectively translated into bias against the applicant.’

[27] ‘I remain of the view that the Commissioner’s conclusion on procedural fairness was not reviewable. There is no reasonable prospect that the Labour Appeal Court would reach a different conclusion.’

[28] ‘The application for leave to appeal largely repeats the grounds advanced in the review application, those grounds were considered in the main judgment. The applicant has not shown that the Labour Appeal Court would reasonably find that the Commissioner’s Award was one that no reasonable decision-maker could reach. The hearsay point concerning the spreadsheet was the applicant’s strongest point in oral argument, however it does not justify leave to appeal.’

[29] ‘On the facts of this case the point is distinguishable from the authorities relied upon by the applicant, was not properly raised during the arbitration and is in any event not dispositive, because the findings on charges 3 and 6 independently sustained dismissal. I am also not persuaded that there is a compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. The matter does not raise a live legal issue requiring determination by the Labour Appeal Court, because the hearsay point would not alter the outcome.’

[30] ‘The third respondent sought costs. Costs in this court are governed by the requirements of law and fairness. Although the application for leave to appeal is unsuccessful, I do not consider that a cost order is warranted.’

Relief: The application for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the review application was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Judgment on SAFLII