C Steinweg Bridge (Pty) Ltd v Democratised Transport and Allied Workers Union & others [2026] ZALCJHB 379

Date of Judgment & Seat of Court: 6 October 2026, Labour Court, Johannesburg

Case No: 2026/224347

Name of Judge(s): Snyman AJ

Summary of Factual Matrix:

DETAWU, which represents employees at the applicant's Durban logistics operations, referred a mutual-interest dispute to the CCMA in December 2024 demanding that the applicant's Industrial Relations Manager be transferred pending an investigation into his conduct towards union members. In August 2025 the parties concluded a Memorandum of Agreement, a collective agreement, in full and final settlement of all disputes: the allegations were to be investigated by an agreed independent third party whose findings would bind the parties, and the CCMA referral was to be withdrawn. The appointed CCMA senior commissioner found that the manager had a case to answer and recommended a written or final written warning; the applicant issued a written warning.

Dissatisfied with that outcome and its implementation, DETAWU obtained picketing rules under the original referral and gave notice of a strike over the manager. The applicant obtained an ex parte rule nisi declaring the strike unprotected under section 65(3)(a)(i) of the LRA; the union anticipated the return date. The issue was whether the collective agreement regulated the issue in dispute so as to prohibit the strike, together with costs.

Summary of Findings:

[3] ‘Confirming the rule nisi entails the granting of final relief, and this being so, the applicant must establish: (a) a clear right; (b) an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and (c) the absence of any other satisfactory remedy.[1] This matter only turns on the first requirement of a clear right, as it was accepted when this matter was argued that the requirements of the absence of a suitable alternative remedy and prejudice (injury apprehended) are met.’

[27] ‘As a general proposition, there can be no doubt that the issue in dispute raised by DETAWU in its referral of 11 December 2024 concerning the conduct of Zuma towards its members, and the demand that he be moved out of the branch pending an investigation, would constitute a lawful demand relating to a matter of mutual interest. Because that is the case, it would be an issue in dispute in respect of which strike action is permitted as a mechanism to resolve that dispute.’

[28] ‘But this right to strike is not without substantive limitation under the LRA, which specifically provides for such substantive limitation in section 65. As stated, the applicant in casu relies on section 65(3)(a). It follows that if the applicant is correct in its contentions in this regard, the applicant will have shown a clear right to exist, and would be entitled to the relief sought.[5] But when construing these kinds of strike restrictions, one should always be mindful of the fact that the right to strike is a fundamental right under the Constitution,[6] and as such the Court should not too readily adopt an interpretation or determination that limits such right.’

[29] ‘It is accepted law that section 65(3)(a) of the LRA does not only apply to substantive determination of the issue in dispute itself. Regulation also includes regulation by way of a process created in the collective agreement which must be applied to resolve the issue in dispute.[8] Or differently described, where the parties agree in the collective agreement that a process will be applied which will resolve the dispute, that process must be applied, and strike action would not be permitted in respect of the dispute.’

[30] ‘Considering the case in casu, it is common cause that the MOA is a collective agreement under the LRA. It is also true that the MOA does not specifically come out and say that the dispute with regard to Zuma, per se, is finally resolved. But what the MOA does is to prescribe an agreed process to apply, and the outcome of that process then constituting a final resolution of the dispute concerning Zuma. In a nutshell, the process is that the dispute will be referred to an independent facilitator appointed by agreement between the parties. That facilitator would then investigate the dispute and complaint, and finally that facilitator will recommend an outcome, which will be final and binding on the parties.’

[31] ‘The aforesaid agreed process in the MOA has the effect and consequences of finally disposing of the dispute in respect of Zuma. Let me perhaps explain it like this. DETAWU clearly has a dispute concerning Zuma. In the ordinary course, the process to resolve that dispute would be strike action. The strike would simply be the course of action to be applied by DETAWU, and if the applicant capitulates to the demands by DETAWU in respect of that dispute, it will finally resolve the dispute relating to Zuma. The process agreed to by the parties in the MOA has exactly the same effect and consequence. But instead of strike action to resolve the dispute, there will be an agreed investigation followed by a final and binding determination by an independent facilitator. In the simplest terms possible, the agreed process replaces any strike as a dispute resolution mechanism. That settles the dispute, once the dispute resolution process is applied, and the recommendation has been issued by the independent facilitator.’

[36] ‘Turning then to the MOA in casu, it came about in order to finally resolve a number of disputes between the parties, including the dispute relating to Zuma. This is firstly evident from clause 4.1 which leaves no doubt at all that everything contained in the MOA was agreed to in full and final settlement of all disputes pertaining to matters of mutual interest currently in existence between them, and all these disputes are thus brought to finality.[15] But not only is it recorded that the agreement is ‘final’, but it is also recorded in clause 4.2 that it is ‘binding’. The agreed process was clearly intended to bring this finality about, binding the parties to the outcome.’

[37] ‘There are further terms in the MOA which support the notion that the process agreed to was intended to finally dispose of the underlying dispute. These are that the independent third party’s recommendation shall be a final recommendation, and that the parries are bound by the findings and recommendations by such third party. It is clear from these terms that the parties intend that the final outcome is left in the hands of the agreed third party, and that this must exclude strike action still being component as a measure to resolve the dispute. It makes no sense for the parties to agree to a final outcome to be determined by a third party, and then DETAWU and its members can simply reject that outcome and revert to their original position if they are dissatisfied with the outcome. But if there is any doubt about this, the specific provision recording that the dispute relating to Zuma referred to the CCMA under case number KNDB14899-24 is withdrawn must finally dispose of any suggestion that the underlying dispute remains live. In general, a withdrawal of a dispute disposes of it like absolution from the instance, and if a party wants to pursue it again, it will have to be referred again, de novo.[18]’

[38] ‘The clear terms of the CCMA referral have been set out earlier, and the agreed withdrawal of such very dispute must mean that it is no longer live. This referral would be the procedural foundation of the strike action, and the fact that it no longer exists must surely indicate that the strike is no longer competent, and is fully substituted by the agreed MOA dispute resolution process. That is why even a de novo referral to the CCMA in this case would not be competent, as the withdrawal of the original dispute is coupled with the institution of an alternative dispute resolution process intended to resolve the underlying dispute relating to Zuma. On the undisputed facts, the agreed process was then applied in full, a third party independent facilitator was appointed, both parties were involved in the investigation, and a final outcome was issued by the third party independent facilitator. That final outcome issued then ended the matter. That can only be what the MOA contemplates.’

[39] ‘However, the reliance by DETAWU on the judgment in County Fair is entirely misplaced. The Court in that judgment was never called upon to decide whether a collective agreement regulates the issue in dispute and that strike action is thus prohibited by virtue of section 65(3)(a)(i) of the LRA.’

[40] ‘It is clear that the aforesaid determination in County Fair is entirely distinguishable from the case in casu. In fact, the Court in County Fair recognised that section 65(3)(a) was another basis upon which a strike could be prohibited.[24] In the current case, the right to strike had accrued to DETAWU and its members, and there was no dispute about that. There is no suggestion that there is a process that must first be followed under the MOA before the right to strike can accrue. What the current matter concerns, as discussed earlier, is not a prohibition of the right to strike relating to a specified issue in dispute. It concerns an agreement by the parties to resolve the underlying dispute in an alternative manner, other than by way of strike action, which strike action would ordinarily be permitted. This brings the matter fully in line with the judgment of the LAC in CSS Tactical, which is the applicable authority. The ratio in County Fair simply does not apply.’

[42] ‘I was not favoured with the recommendation by Dubazane. But that does not matter. It is not appropriate, in the course of this dispute, to seek to interpret what this final recommendation envisages, namely whether it allows for the applicant to simply issue a written warning, or whether it needed to first have a disciplinary hearing and consult DETAWU on an outcome. This is because this would be an entirely different dispute. It is clear that the recommendation by Dubazane is the end product of the agreed process in terms of the MOA. As such, it would form an integral component of the MOA as collective agreement, as its very purpose is to arrive at such outcome. Therefore, how this outcome (recommendation) falls to be applied concerns an issue of the interpretation and application of the collective agreement (MOA) itself. It simply does not resurrect the underlying dispute which in essence, in terms of the CCMA referral itself, requires the removal of Zuma pending an investigation. As a matter of common sense, the investigation has happened, a recommendation has been made, so how can a dispute concerning the removal of Zuma even remain feasible? The live issue is therefore the recommendation, what it means, and how it is to be applied by the applicant. That is a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the MOA and must be dealt with under section 24 of the LRA.[25] DETAWU is crying at the wrong funeral.’

[43] ‘In fact, DETAWU’s own version speaks to the fact that the true or real remaining dispute concerns the interpretation and application of the recommendation by Dubazane as a product of the MOA. No matter how one looks at it, the recommendation by Dubazane stipulates that a disciplinary sanction must be meted out to Zuma, either in the form of a written warning or a final written warning. Even if the applicant holds a disciplinary hearing, consults DETAWU and issues a final written warning as the maximum recommended sanction, the outcome of the removal of Zuma from site in terms of the original referral is simply not competent. All that remains to be decided is whether the applicant should consider a final written warning for Zuma, consult NEHAWU, and have a disciplinary hearing if needed. As said, this is an issue in dispute that must be resolved by arbitration under section 24 of the LRA, and not by this Court at this juncture.[26]’

[44] ‘DETAWU has one last arrow in its quiver. It contends that under section 23(2) of the Constitution, it has a constitutional right to strike, and this right would be infringed if its strike action in this case is prohibited. But this contention cannot assist DETAWU, by virtue of the application of the principle of subsidiarity, which makes direct reliance on the Constitution in the case of disputes under the LRA impermissible. The concept of permitted strike action, and the prohibition thereof in appropriate circumstances, is directly regulated by the LRA, pursuant to the Constitutional imperative in section 23, and the LRA gives actual effect to this right.[28] It follows that DETAWU cannot rely on the Constitution directly to assert its and its members’ right to strike. It is bound to the provisions of the LRA.’

[45] ‘It is thus my conclusion that section 65(3)(a)(i) directly finds application in this instance, and the applicant’s reliance on this provision is justified. The MOA finally resolved the issue in dispute relating to the dispute referral by DETAWU to the CCMA concerning the removal of Zuma off site pending an investigation. It resolved that dispute by way of an alternative agreed resolution process, in the form of an investigation by an independent third party, who would then prepare a final outcome and recommendation to which the parties were finally bound. DETAWU undertook to withdraw the dispute referred to the CCMA. And the MOA expressly recorded that it was concluded in full and final settlement and was binding on all the parties. Insofar as any issue in dispute remains in existence between the parties, it concerns the interpretation and application of the recommendation issued by the independent third party under the MOA, and is therefore a dispute that must be resolved by virtue of section 24 of the LRA. The rule nisi falls to be confirmed.’

[46] ‘In all the circumstances as set out above, the applicant has successfully demonstrated a clear right to the relief it seeks. The strike that DETAWU sought to institute as from 14 September 2026 would constitute an unprotected strike as a result of the application of section 65(3)(a)(i) of the LRA, in that the MOA is a collective agreement that regulates the issue in dispute forming the subject matter of the strike, finally resolving it. As the other requirements for a final order were not really in issue, the applicant is thus entitled to the final relief of a confirmation of the rule nisi. The rule nisi must therefore be confirmed.’

[49] ‘I consider that there is substance in the complaints raised by the applicant. The terms of the MOA were not ambiguous nor unclear. To the contrary, it was quite clear what it intended to achieve. Before the MOA was concluded, DETAWU and its members were free, by just giving notice under section 64(1), to pursue strike action. But they elected to instead agree on an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. To make it worse, it was even agreed to withdraw the underlying issue in dispute. For DETAWU and its shop stewards to then adopt an approach, when the ultimate outcome does not suit, that resurrects the original dispute so that strike action can be pursued, is disingenuous.’

[50] ‘The applicant, when DETAWU sought to adopt the approach that it did, specifically warned it in a letter of demand by the applicant on 19 August 2026 that if strike action was sought to be pursued, it would be unprotected. The applicant set out the reasons why this would be the case. It further made it clear that an interdict, and costs, would be sought if DETAWU persisted. Not only was this warning not heeded, but it was effectively ignored.’

[51] ‘In my view, for DETAWU to continue to assert that it was entitled to still pursue strike action where it came to the dispute in respect of Zuma was always an untenable proposition. As a matter of common sense and logic, especially considering the clear provisions of the MOA, it would simply make no sense that all the expense and effort that went into the alternative dispute resolution process agreed to effectively meant nothing, and it could all be discarded so DETAWU and its members could take up their original position where they were not satisfied with the outcome. Even in Court, DETAWU was unable to contradict the terms of the MOA and simply could not answer what an agreed withdrawal of the underlying dispute meant. The opposition in this case was, for all intents and purposes, hopeless.’

[52] ‘DETAWU has argued that a costs order would not be appropriate because of the ongoing relationship between it and the applicant. There is at least some merit in this contention. As a general proposition, it has been said that an ongoing relationship mitigates against costs orders.[33] But again, an ongoing relationship between the parries is not some blanket immunity against costs order. This Court still remains entitled to exercise a discretion, with due consideration of all the facts that led to the dispute and the conduct of the parties, where it comes to awarding costs.’

[55] ‘The sentiments expressed in Tsogo Sun and SA Airways Technical indeed find application in casu. Other than simply relying on the existence of a continued relationship, DETAWU has not advanced a cogent case how the continued relationship would be compromised by a costs order. As stated above, DETAWU was properly forewarned by the applicant, but decided to press on. If only a modicum of focus was put into considering the terms of the MOA, DETAWU should never have sought to embark upon the envisaged strike action, as the issue in dispute had been resolved by way of an agreed process and the underlying dispute had been withdrawn. If DETAWU had acted responsibly, it should rather have sought to preserve the relationship and not harm it by seeking to pursue unfounded strike action. And finally, specifically, it must be made clear, by way of a costs order, that the outcome of collective bargaining should be respected, and given proper effect to.’

[56] ‘For all the reasons set out above, and exercising the wide discretion I have where it comes to costs, it is my view that a costs order against DETAWU is indeed justified and earned. There are no particular considerations of fairness that mitigates against it. I also only intend to make the costs order against DETAWU, and not the individual employees, thereby putting responsibility in the right place. I shall therefore order DETAWU to pay the applicant’s costs, on the party and party scale B.’

Relief: Paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 of the rule nisi of 11 September 2026, declaring the intended strike unprotected and interdicting it, were confirmed as a final order. DETAWU alone was ordered to pay the applicant's costs on the party and party scale B. (Order granted on 29 September 2026; written reasons delivered on 6 October 2026.)

Judgment on SAFLII