POPCRU OBO ZONDI v MINISTER OF POLICE [2026] ZALCJHB 116

Date of Judgment & Seat of Court: 8 April 2026; Labour Court of South Africa, Johannesburg

Name of Judge(s): Steenkamp AJ

Summary of Factual Matrix: 

The applicant was employed by the Presidential Protection Services (PPS) of SAPS, stationed in Durban. Following tension with Lieutenant Colonel Ngcobo and reciprocal complaints, an internal investigation recommended the applicant's re-deployment as an interim measure. 

On 21 January 2025, she was permanently re-deployed to the Information Management Centre. The applicant acknowledged receipt on 29 January 2025 but allegedly continued attending at her original post. 

On 28 May 2025, she was charged with failing to comply with the re-deployment instruction. Her salary was stopped on 30 August 2025; she became aware on 9 September 2025. She ceased reporting for duty on 10 September 2025, alleging lack of financial means. Letters of demand were issued in October 2025 and February 2026. 

This urgent application was launched on 5 March 2026, seeking declaration that withholding salary was unlawful and an order for restoration of remuneration.

Summary of Findings:

"[22] As a point of departure, Rule 3(1) of the Labour Court Rules stipulates the following in respect of the seat where proceedings must be initiated: 'Unless the Judge President directs otherwise, proceedings must be initiated at the seat of the court nearest the place where the dispute which is the subject matter of the proceedings arose.'"

"[28] In the oft quoted authority of Jiba v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others ('Jiba'), this Court held that: 'Rule 8 of the rules of this Court require a party seeking urgent relief to set out the reasons for urgency and why urgent relief is necessary. It is trite law that there are degrees of urgency. And the degree to which the ordinary applicable rules should be relaxed is dependent on the degree of urgency. It is equally trite that an applicant is not entitled to rely on urgency that is self-created when seeking a deviation from the rules.'"

"[29] It is trite that urgency may not be self created by an applicant through a failure to institute proceedings at the earliest reasonable opportunity. The diligence and expedition with which a litigant acts upon the occurrence of the cause of action are material considerations in determining whether a matter is indeed urgent. Any undue delay following the event giving rise to the litigation invariably undermines, if not negates, the assertion of urgency."

"[33] With regard to the issue of non-payment of remuneration leading to financial hardship as a ground for urgency, in Democratic Nursing Organization of South Africa and Another v Director General Department of Health and Others ('Denosa') Molahleni, J (as he then was) said the following: '... In order to succeed when reliance is based on financial hardship, exceptional circumstances must be shown before urgent interim relief can be granted.'"

"[52] The Applicant would have had to advance excellent reasons why her matter remains urgent, some 6 months after the alleged wrong having occurred, whilst on the version of the trade union, they always had the intention to launch this application. Put differently, if the Applicant genuinely intended to launch this application since the alleged stoppage of her salary, why did it take 6 months to initiate the matter? No reasonable explanation, let alone an acceptable one has been advanced in casu. This Court is of the view that the facts of this case are the epitome of self-created urgency."

As such, the Court held that: 

(i) the application was improperly initiated in Johannesburg rather than Durban, contrary to Rule 3(1); 

(ii) urgency was self-created through unreasonable delay of approximately six months between the salary stoppage (September 2025) and launching the application (March 2026); 

(iii) financial hardship alone does not establish urgency absent exceptional circumstances;

(iv) the explanation blaming former attorneys was inadequate, as neither the applicant nor the trade union took reasonable steps to ensure instructions were executed; and 

(v) the applicant failed to demonstrate why substantial redress could not be obtained in the ordinary course.

Order:

"1. The application is struck from the roll due to lack of urgency; 

2. POPCRU is ordered to pay the Respondent's party and party costs, including the cost of Counsel where so employed, on Scale B."