MASIMLA v PIONEER GROUP (PTY) LTD AND OTHERS [2026] ZALCCT 65

Date of Judgment & Seat of Court: 8 April 2026; Labour Court of South Africa, Cape Town

Name of Judge(s): Lagrange J

Summary of Factual Matrix:

The plaintiff was employed by Pioneer Fishing as Human Resources Manager from March 2015. From approximately 2020, she reported on a 'dotted-line' basis to Mr Pieter Greeff, an independent contractor appointed as Group COO. 

During 2020, they engaged in a consensual romantic relationship which ended on 19 April 2022, initiated by Greeff. Subsequently, a contemplated formalisation of a Group HR Manager role (for which Greeff had expressed strong support on 1 May 2022) was placed on hold on 19 May 2022. 

The plaintiff alleged Greeff's conduct became hostile thereafter. She lodged grievances and reported his conduct to the Group CEO. In February 2023, following a meeting between the plaintiff and Greeff, adverse employee statements were obtained, an independent investigation was conducted, and disciplinary proceedings were instituted.

 The plaintiff was dismissed on 14 June 2023. She claimed automatically unfair dismissal under section 187(1)(f) of the LRA (reason relating to discrimination, namely quid pro quo sexual harassment) and, alternatively, unfair dismissal for misconduct.

Summary of Findings:

"[6] Section 60 of the EEA states: '60 Liability of employers (1) If it is alleged that an employee, while at work, contravened a provision of this Act, or engaged in any conduct that, if engaged in by that employee's employer, would constitute a contravention of a provision of this Act, the alleged conduct must immediately be brought to the attention of the employer. (2) The employer must consult all relevant parties and must take the necessary steps to eliminate the alleged conduct and comply with the provisions of this Act. (3) If the employer fails to take the necessary steps referred to in subsection (2), and it is proved that the employee has contravened the relevant provision, the employer must be deemed also to have contravened that provision. (4) Despite subsection (3), an employer is not liable for the conduct of an employee if that employer is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in contravention of this Act.' (emphasis added)"

"[12] Despite the wider range of workplace participants whose conduct is covered by the code, I am not persuaded that the wording of the Code extends the scope of employer liability for employee acts of harassments in the workplace under section 60(3) of the EEA, to include liability for for the conduct of non-employees in the workplace. In this regard it is important to point fall within the ambit of the EEA but may fall within the ambit of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. Moreover, even though in interpreting the application of the EEA, one must take account of a code of good conduct, the code of good conduct which is a guideline to conduct cannot, in and of itself, indirectly create new forms of liability. That would require an amendment of s 60."

"[15] However, the plaintiff argues that when it comes to the claim of automatically unfair dismissal the first defendant was instrumental in giving effect to the vindicative actions of Greef caused by the termination of the romantic relationship because it was the party setting up the disciplinary enquiry at his instigation and it proceeded to dismiss her thereby fulfilling the negative consequence of quid pro quo sexual harassment allegedly committed by Greeff. This was specifically pleaded in paragraph 71 of the statement of claim, unlke the other acts of discrimination which were directly attributed to Greef alone. Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove this claim is another matter, but it seems to me that Pioneer can be held directly liable as the employer if the plaintiff can prove it made common cause with the contractor and dismissed her in fulfilment of an intention on his part to have her dismissed on account of the improper reason alleged."

"[52] In identifying the type of unfair discrimination characterising the underlying basis of her automatically unfair dismissal claim, the plaintiff correctly cites clause 5.2.6.2 of the Harassment Code: 'Quid pro quo harassment occurs where a person such as an owner, employer, supervisor, member of management or co-employee, influences or attempts to influence an employee's employment circumstances (for example engagement, promotion, training, discipline, dismissal, salary increments or other benefits) by coercing or attempting to coerce an employee to surrender to sexual advances.' (emphasis added)"

"[61] In light of the analysis above, the plaintiff did not make out even a prima facie case of sexual harassment having occurred. From that it follows her dismissal could not have been caused by her resistance to such behaviour. Consequently, her claim of automatically unfair dismissal must fail."

As such the Court held: 

(i) Section 60 of the EEA provides for vicarious liability only for conduct of employees, not independent contractors; the Harassment Code cannot extend statutory liability. 

(ii) However, the employer could be directly liable for automatically unfair dismissal if it made common cause with the contractor in dismissing the plaintiff to fulfil his allegedly discriminatory intention. 

(iii) On the evidence, the plaintiff failed to establish even a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment: the relationship was consensual and ended by Greeff; there was no evidence of sexual advances or coercion after the breakup; and the dismissal followed an independent investigation and disciplinary process. Without proof of sexual harassment, the dismissal could not have been caused by resistance to such conduct.

Order:

"1. The Plaintiff's claim that she was automatically unfairly dismissed by the First Respondent under section 187(1)(f) of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 is dismissed. 

2. No order is made as to costs."