Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union v Motorvia (1993) Pty Ltd – Uitenhage

Citation: [2026] ZALCPE 9

Presiding Judge: Lagrange J

Court: Labour Court of South Africa at Gqeberha (Port Elizabeth)

Nature of the Application

[1] This matter concerned a special plea raised by the defendant, Motorvia, to a referral of an unfair dismissal claim for alleged participation in strike action. The central question was whether a settlement agreement concluded on 2 March 2021 precluded the prosecution of a subsequent unfair dismissal dispute.

Factual Matrix

[2] The dispute arose during March and April 2020 amidst the implementation of 'lockdown' regulations under the Covid-19 pandemic. The company contended that employees had embarked on unprotected strike action on the eve of the first severe lockdown regulations at the end of March 2020.

[3] When work was to resume at the end of May 2020, the 32 plaintiffs claimed they were prevented from returning to work. Initially, they treated their exclusion as a dismissal and referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA. Upon conciliation, the company advised they had not been dismissed but merely excluded from the premises. Accordingly, the plaintiffs withdrew that dispute and referred a fresh dispute over an unfair suspension under case number ECPE 3145-20 on 18 June 2020 ('the suspension dispute').

[4] Only on or about 5 October 2020, after protracted disciplinary proceedings, were the plaintiffs dismissed for the alleged strike action in March. This prompted them to refer an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA the following day, under case number ECPE 5425-20, which was referred to arbitration on 23 October 2020.

[5] On 2 March 2021, when the unfair suspension proceedings at the CCMA reconvened, the parties signed a settlement agreement. In terms thereof, the unfair suspension dispute was resolved. However, the company contended that the agreement also settled the unfair dismissal claim, which by then had not yet been referred to the Labour Court.

The Settlement Agreement – Material Provisions

[10] The preamble to the agreement read:

"WHEREAS the Union, on behalf of the listed Employees has referred a dispute under case number: ECPE 3145-20. WHEREAS the parties have amicably agreed to settle the dispute between them. WHEREFORE the parties agree as follows:...."

[13] Clause 7a stated:

"The Applicant hereby unconditionally withdraws the dispute, which has been lodged with the CCMA under case number ECPE 3145-20."

[14] Clause 7b (the second clause numbered 7) read:

"This settlement agreement and/or any payment in terms thereof does not constitute an admission of liability by the Respondent or Applicant and is in full and final settlement of any claims that the Applicant may have against the Respondent arising out of their services with the Respondent or the termination thereof."

[15] Clause 8 provided:

"The Applicant acknowledges that it fully understands the consequences of this full and final settlement, that the same has been explained to it and that it enters into this full and final settlement freely and voluntarily. The applicant furthermore agrees it was not forced and/or coerced into signing this agreement."

Legal Principles: Interpretation of Agreements

[18] Lagrange J applied the seminal approach established in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA):

"[18] The present state of the law can be expressed as follows: Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these factors. The process is objective, not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document."

[19] The Court endorsed the approach of Schreiner JA in Jaga v Dönges NO and Another; Bhana v Dönges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A):

"Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statement that the words and expressions used in a statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning is the statement that they must be interpreted in the light of their context. But it may be useful to stress two points in relation to the application of this principle. The first is that 'the context', as here used, is not limited to the language of the rest of the statute regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted. Often of more importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, its background. The second point is that the approach to the work of interpreting may be along either of two lines. Either one may split the inquiry into two parts and concentrate, in the first instance, on finding out whether the language to be interpreted has or appears to have one clear ordinary meaning, confining a consideration of the context only to cases where the language appears to admit of more than one meaning; or one may from the beginning consider the context and the language to be interpreted together."

Judicial Analysis and Evaluation

[38]–[42] The Court identified objective factors relevant to interpretation:

"Firstly, the CCMA hearing was only convened to arbitrate the unfair suspension dispute. Secondly, the case number in the headnote of the agreement only referred to the suspension dispute, even though Andrews drew it up. Thirdly, there was no express reference to the dismissal dispute in any of the provisions of the agreement. Fourthly, the union had handed the dismissal dispute over to the union's attorneys and Nguntze had not come to the CCMA with a view to settling the dismissal dispute, even if Andrews claims he had a mandate to settle both. Fifthly, the potential relief the employees might obtain, if successful with their unfair dismissal claim, compared to the relief in the unfair suspension dispute would plainly outweigh the significance of the latter. It does seem less probable that the unfair dismissal claim was intended to be referred to only by implication, rather than by express reference, if it was the parties' intention to settle it in the same agreement."

[43]–[44] Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court addressed the express wording of clause 7b:

"Against these factors is the express wording of clause 7b which on its own would ordinarily encompass any dispute, including the dismissal dispute. The dismissal dispute had occurred and had been unsuccessfully conciliated. It is true the company might not have known if that dispute would proceed, but Andrews claimed he came with a mandate to settle that dispute as well. It was an identifiable dispute with a designated CCMA case number, yet in drafting the settlement which Andrews intended to settle both disputes with, he supposedly consciously chose not to identify it, but rather to capture it under a generic 'full and final' settlement provision. It seems somewhat improbable the parties would not have specifically referred to that dispute, if they intended to settle it, rather than using the general phrasing in paragraph 7b, which is typically intended by one party to ensure they are not exposed to potential but unknown claims which might still be launched. The dismissal dispute was known, identifiable and unresolved."

[58]–[60] The Court invoked the principle against superfluity, citing Wellworths Bazaars Ltd v Chandler's Ltd 1947 (2) SA 37 (A) and the Constitutional Court in Minister of Finance v Afribusiness NPC 2022 (4) SA 362 (CC):

"[58] 'But a Court should be slow to come to the conclusion that the words are tautologous or superfluous. It was said by the Privy Council in Ditcher v Denison (11 moore P.C. 325, at p. 357):-'It is a good general rule in jurisprudence that one who reads a legal document whether public or private, should not be prompt to ascribe- should not, without necessity or some sound reason, impute- to its language tautology or superfluity, and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every word intended to have some effect or be of some use.' [59] The principle has been endorsed many times by other courts and by the Constitutional Court most recently in Minister of Finance v Afribusiness NPC 2022 (4) SA 362 (CC) viz: 'On first principles, our jurisprudence on interpretation requires that each word must — as far as possible — be given meaning.'"

[62] The Court identified AMCU's underlying contention:

"In my view, what this brings to light is AMCU's real underlying contention about clause 7b, namely that it should not have been part of the settlement agreement and a correct rendering of the agreement would exclude it altogether. However, the remedy for that lies in rectification, and cannot be 'cured' by discerning the correct meaning of the agreement as it presently stands."

Order

"1. The special plea is upheld. 2. In terms of clause 7b of the settlement agreement concluded on 2 March 2021, attached as Annexure 'A' to the Defendant's Statement of Response, the Plaintiffs' unfair dismissal claim was settled, and this court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim. 3. No order is made as to costs."