Arcelormittal South Africa Limited v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) and Others [2026] ZALAC 11

Seat of the Court: The Labour Appeal Court of South Africa, Johannesburg

Presiding Judges: Nkutha-Nkontwana JA, Davis AJA and Musi AJA (Judgment delivered by Davis AJA)

Summary of the Basis of the Claim

The Appellant, Arcelormittal South Africa Limited, appealed against a judgment of the Labour Court (Erasmus AJ) which dismissed its application to review and set aside a designation ruling of the Essential Services Committee ("ESC"). The ESC had determined that the blast furnace and coke battery operations at the Appellant's steel plant did not constitute "essential services" as defined in section 213 of the LRA. The Appellant contended that interruption of these operations would endanger the life, personal safety or health of its employees during the requisite shutdown procedures, and therefore sought a declaration that these operations be designated as essential services to limit the right to strike in those areas.

Analysis and Findings of the Court with Direct Quotations

On the Interpretation of "Essential Services" and the Right to Strike.

 "[20] In *Police and Prison Civil Rights Union v South African Police Services and others*, the Constitutional Court said:

'In order to ascertain the meaning of essential service, regard must be had to the purpose of the legislation... An important purpose of the LRA is to give effect to the right to strike entrenched in s 23(2)(c) of the Constitution... For this reason a restrictive interpretation of essential service must, if possible, be adopted so as to avoid impermissibly limiting the right to strike. Were legislation to define essential service too broadly this would permissibly limit the right to strike.'" (para 20)

On the Meaning of "Any Part of the Population"

"[22] If the interpretation of essential service must be crafted to ensure no unjustifiable limitation of the right to strike, then in particular the phrase 'any part of the population' cannot on its own without more encompass a set of workers who are engaged in the service. Part of the population clearly means a segment of the broader South African population who would be affected were the essential service not be delivered. The harm which is the focus of this dispute is essentially occupational which affects workers on site but cannot, without significant expansion, be interpreted to encompass a significant portion of the South African population or even a segment thereof." (para 22)

On the Guidance of International Labour Organisation Standards

"[24] Significantly, the ILO sets out the following which it considers to be essential services, the hospital sector, the electricity services, water supply services, the telephone service, the police and the armed forces, the firefighting services, public or private prison services, the provision of food to pupils of school age and the cleaning of schools and air traffic control. This list indicates the very purpose of 'essential services' affecting, at the least part of the population, are services which are essentially required by the general population as part thereof." (para 24)

"[25] Most certainly, this Court is entitled to apply the approach adopted by the ILO, for in terms of section 39(1) of the Constitution, this Court is required to engage in the interpretation of the Constitution which promotes the values of an open democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, while considering international law and it may consider foreign law." (para 25)

On Occupational Hazards versus Essential Services.

"[27] ... essential services are provided to the population at large or to a segment thereof. That is why hospital services, firefighting or police are considered to be essential services." (para 27)

"[28] It must follow that the risks which flow from the evidence provided by the appellant were correctly classified as occupational hazards as opposed to that which affects the whole or part of the population and hence activities/ conduct that falls within the scope of essential services." (para 28)

On the Proper Balance between the Right to Strike and Section 213:

"[29] Appellant's case requires of this Court to extend the concept of essential services far further than a purposive interpretation permits. It would strike an improper balance between the right to strike and section 213 of the LRA." (para 29)

Order of the Court

 "Order

1. The appeal is dismissed, with costs." (para 30)